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As the financial crisis effects continue to spread around the world, Romania is no exception to 
the  global  economic  climate,  as  the  country  continues  its  attempts  to  better  integrate  into  the 
European Union.  
To what extent is the Romanian residential market affected by the United State financial 
crisis? What are the causes and effects of the Romanian crisis? How has the crisis evolved so far and 
our prognostics regarding it? These are some of the questions to which we answer in the present 
article.  
We will take into consideration factors such as the residential market of both new and old 
products, comparing their evolution up until March 2009 and studying their prices, units sold, and 
latest projects focused on our nation’s capital. Our prognostics estimates that the residential market 
will start the process of revitalization by Q4 2009 – Q2 2010, when the great demand will be 
sustained by good bank credit loans. 
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Over  the  last  few  years,  prosperity  reigned  over  the  Romanian  residential 
market, attracting local, as well as foreign investors. The year 2007 was particularly 
successful in that the sales of both old and new apartments was on a continuously 
rising slope. Such was not the case with 2008, and a change for the worse arrived that 
year.  
The  highest  market  prices  of  the  Romanian  residential  products  peaked  in 
March April  2008.  The  prices  stagnated  in  July,  after  which  they  went  into  a 
downward slope starting August. The effect of the global financial crisis was finally 
hitting the residential market even in Romania. Romania had been enjoying record 
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To  get  a  better  idea  of  what  caused  this  crisis  nationally,  we  must  gain  an 
understanding of how it all started in the US and just how it made its way all the way 
to Romania. As a result, we have identified the following categories of causes: macro  
and micro economic, organizational, legislative, financial, and monetary.  
SUA, The Economic Crisis Starter. Over the last twenty years, the US was 
considered  the  driving  engine  of  the  global  economic  growth.  Authorities 
encouraged consumer spending and brought in rapid growth through fast and easy 
crediting.  The  Federal  Reserve,  however,  warned  in  2007  that  consumer  debt 
stemming from unpaid mortgage rates had $ 100,000 billion dollars. 
Thus, the first warning signs of the crisis came as early as 2007, as numerous 
small credit institutions went bankrupt from mortgage subprime loans. Then came 
the collapse of the bigger companies, banks and investment funds who were citing 
the  same  reasons  for  their  losses.  Still,  financial  analysts  insisted  there  were  no 
reasons to panic.  
In Europe, the first effect of the crisis was felt on August 9, 2007, when BNP 
Paribas, the bank with most assets on the Euro territory, cancelled its paying of three 
debt  funds.  The  reason?  The  funds  could  no  longer  be  evaluated  due  to  their 
exposure to the US mortgage subprime loans. Up until fall 2007, the crisis spread 
across Europe, affecting the banks from England (Northern Rock went bankrupt), 
Germany and even the Switzerland through the losses suffered by UBS AG and 
Credit Suisse Group.  
At the end of October, 2007, BNR increases for the first time its reference 
interest rate, and governor Mugur Isarescu announces that some assets’ prices can be 
“inflated.” One month later, Standard & Poor’s lowers Romania’s rating due to the 
increase in the foreign deficit, and the Euro goes over 3,5 Lei.  
Despite efforts from both the EU and the US Federal Reserve to prevent the 
crisis from worsening, the end of the year 2007 brings yet more bad financial news 
from banks such as UBS, Citigroup, Merrill Lunch, and Morgan Stanley. In January 
2009, the financial markets continued to suffer and the stock markets worldwide 
were declining significantly. In Romania, the reference interest increased from 7,5% 
to 8%, and the national currency continued to lose its value (e.g. 3,61 Lei per Euro in 
December versus 3,13 Lei per Euro, its lowest value that year).  
In  2008,  the  US  implemented  fiscal  and  monetary  strategies  to  stimulate 
consumer spending and economic growth. [Congress approved a federal bailout of 
the US financial system and the Federal Reserve System (FDS) lowered its reference 
interest rate. However, the banks used the bailout money to cover for their losses. In 
April 2008, 55% of the banks operating on the US territory made it more difficult for Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 4, No. 3 
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consumers and businesses to obtain credit, which went against the initial goal of the 
Federal Reserve.  
In  April,  the  Standard  &  Poor’s  agency  also  publicized  its  analysis  results, 
according to which Romania was one of the most vulnerable countries in the face of 
the US economic crisis, next to Libya and Turkey.  
Crisis Propagation Causes into Romania. The internal causes of Romania’s 
exposure to the foreign crisis are related, on the one hand, to the current funds 
deficit, the inconsistencies in Bucharest’s stock exchange, the interest on the bank 
deposits held by the Federal Reserve, the low sustainability of the public finances, as 
well as the increase in foreign debt.  
On the other hand, the extent to which the American crisis affected Romania is 
based on three types of effects: 
The  Contagion  Effect—the  spread  of  the  instability  from  one  region  to 
another—seen  as  a  result  of  globalization,  leads  to  the  similarities  between  the 
economic cycles of the world’s biggest economic powers (US, Europe, China and 
Japan).  
The  Cumulative  Casualty  Effect:  the  imbalance  occurring  in  one  region 
compensates the imbalances in other regions, leading to shock waves.  
The Herd Effect: The managers of high risk investments compete against each 
other simultaneously over the same territories. Thus, they also simultaneously leave 
these territories when the potential for profit decreases. 
 
European Causes. Along with the globalization and European factors, which 
are related to Romania’s dependency on Europe and Europe’s dependency on the 
US, there are also the institutional factors that we take into consideration in this 
context. 
These  factors  arise  from  the  lack  of  certain  regulatory  institutions  at  the 
European level when it comes to financial risks. To fix these aspects, the European 
Union (EU) restructured its internal composition and implemented CERS and SESV. 
Another  shortfall  compensated  by  the  Larosiere  Report  is  the  lack  of  the 
mechanisms which deal with crisis.  
When it comes to global institutional causes, we may include the absence of a 
timely warning about the macroeconomic and financial risks, and the appropriate 
solution provided by the FMI. According to G20, this one will work closely with 
Financial Stability Board in order to archive it.  
Even so, if we were to learn a lesson from the  harsh reality of the current 
economic crisis it is that regulations and supervisions can co exist even with all the 
modernization of the financial markets. Speaking of which, another cause for the 
current crisis is at the level of companies and private individuals and it is called 
responsibility. On one hand, risk management could be bigger of a priority for the 
big companies; on the other, the population at large (each one of us) could limit its 
consumption as to not exceed the limits of the household budget.  




Causes of the Mortgage Crisis in Romania. 
 
The  construction  industry  rates  in  third  in  the  bankruptcy  statistics  for  all 
industries, and this is for a good reason. It is the first sector to be affected by the 
crisis due to the stalling of the housing market, the banks decision to cut credits for 
construction related expenses, late payments from the state budget owed from the 
last months of 2008, as well as some of the investors announcing to delay or stop 
their housing market investments. In other words, starting halfway through the year 
2008, it became very obvious that construction companies were having a difficult 
time paying their debt and accessing their finances. Supply chain problems made 
problems  with  the  cash  flow  even  worse,  since  companies  were  not  receiving 
payments from their clients and, in turn, could also not pay what they owed. 
The  rising  cost  of  construction  materials  also  had a  negative  impact  on the 
activity of the construction companies. Along with assumptions made by investors, it 
also became obvious that land price and construction material cost contributed to 
the rise in the housing prices and to the halt mentioned above. The second half of 
2008  brought  in  a  significant  decrease  in  prices.  In  particular,  the  forged steel 
products’ prices decreased by 40 to 50%.  
The fact that the year 2009 brought a rise in bankruptcy for the housing market 
comes as no surprise to anyone. After all, at the end of 2008 it was almost impossible 
for the construction companies to pay their debt, and this did not change well into 
2009. Moreover, state budget payments have yet to be completed, credits are almost 
impossible to obtain from the banks, and investments in the financial market are not 
to be expected anytime soon.  
 
Crisis effects  
 
The effects over the Romanian Residential Market rise in the development of 
the  following  indicators:  transactions,  prices,  production,  bankruptcies,  crediting, 
credit debts.  
Bankruptcies. Between January 1st and November 17th, 2008, the number of 
bankruptcies  in  building materials  and  construction  industries  nearly  doubled 
compared  to  a  similar  period  in  the  previous  year.  Of  the  total  number  of 
bankruptcies  recorded  by  ONRC  in  the  2008  period  mentioned,  84.7%  were 
recorded by the Romanian capital companies. 
 
The construction industry recorded 1.200 bankruptcies in 2008 (compared to 
525  in  2007),  followed  by  the  housing  transaction related  bankruptcies  with  900 
(compared to 448 in 2007). 
Ten  percent  of  the  real  estate  members  who  are  part  of  ARAI  declared 
bankruptcy  between  October  2008  and  March  2009.  The  rest  of  the  real  estate 
members, having no properties to sell, make a living out of renting or consulting. 
Some  of  them  have  also  developed  auxiliary  businesses,  such  as  housing Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 4, No. 3 
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administration, interior design, moving services, or cleaning service (this according to 
the ARAI).  
The rise in bankruptcies was caused, up until October 2008, by the creditors’ 
desire  to  recover  their  investments  as  soon  as  possible,  which  means  that  the 
insolvency process represents the fastest way of legally recovering investments from 
debtors.  
 
Credit debts. Credit debt increased by 48.4% in the first two months of 2009, 
up  to  4.252  billions  Lei  (991  millions  Euros).  On  December  31st,  2008,  the 
Romanian population at large as well as the Romanian firms had leftover debt owed 
to the banks summing up to 2.865 billions Lei (719 millions Euros). 
On the foreign currency side, the leftover debt has now reached 1.831 billions 
Lei (426.8 million Euros), increasing by 84.4% from the end of 2008 when it was at 
993.3  millions  Lei  (249  millions  Euros).  These  numbers  were  influenced  by  the 
depreciation of the Leu (by 7.7% between the end of December and February 28th), 
considering that the Central Bank releases its statistics in Lei equivalents.  
The leftover debt increased at a slower pace (29%) during the first two months, 
from 1.872 billions Lei (469 millions Euros) up to 2.421 billions Lei (564,25 millions 
Euros), according to BNR. As a result of the increase in unpaid debt, the overall 
leftover debt stemming from bank loans reached 2.05% at the end of February, from 
1.44% at the end of 2008 to 0.82% on Febrary 29, 2008.  
Both companies and the population at large carried leftover debt that increased 
by 72% during the first two months of 2009 and reached a value of 1.42 billions Lei 
(330.4  millions  Euros);  of  this  amount,  70%  was  borrowed  in  foreign  currency. 
Coming in second place after Bucharest, the largest amount of leftover debt was 
recorded in Brasov with 195.11 million Lei (45.47 million Euros), followed by Timis 
with 174.16 million Lei (40.6 million Euros).  
 
Crediting. Starting September 2008, banks increased their costs significantly for 
mortgage loans in Euro, the annual interest rates increasing from 8.23% annually up 
to 11.3% in January 2009, according to the Central Bank’s statistics.  
In November 2008, the International Ratings Agency Fitch lowered Romania’s 
ratings for long term, foreign currency loans, from BBB to BB+, and for long term 
loans in Lei from BBB+ to BBB . This evaluation is based on the agency’s concerns 
regarding Romania’s macroeconomic politics and the country’s capacity to avoid a 
severe economic and financial crisis. Fitch’s decision pulls out Romania from the 
category of states that received “investment grade” type of scores, says Reuters. This 
also comes after Standard & Poor’s lowered Romania’s ratings as well at the end of 
October. 
February 2009 was the first in the last seven when the interest rates decreased. 
The rate of the banks’ annual interest rate for the Euro decreased as well, from 
11,30% annually in January to 9.26% annually. Local banks relaxed their terms for 




borrowing from foreign financial institutions. This also led to decreases in interest 
rates for the banks from their lenders, which, in turn, led to decreases in interest rates 
for the banks’ clients. This better cash flow at the monetary market level, which led 
to  a  decrease  in  interest  rates  for  crediting  among  banks,  also  allowed  for  the 
decrease of interest rates for loans in Lei.  
In  February,  the  leftover  debt  from  the  credit  awarded  by  non government 
institutions  rose  by  0.2%  ( .7%  in  real  terms)  compared  to  January  2009,  up  to 
206.890,1  million  Lei,  according  to  data  released  by  the  BNR. The  credit  in  Lei 
maintained a steady slope in February (in real terms, it decreased by 0.9%), while the 
credit in foreign currency expressed in Lei increased by 0.4% (in Euros, the foreign 
currency credit increased by 0.1%).  
At  the  end  of  February  the  credit  awarded  by  non government  institutions 
recorded an increase of over 30.7% (22.2% in real terms) compared to February 
29th, 2008, due to the increase by 17.3% of the Lei component (9.7% in real terms), 
and by 41.7% of the foreign component expressed in Lei (in Euros, the rise of the 
foreign currency value was 23.1%). 
Between April and May 2009, banks are forced to go back to crediting after the 
banking system recorded losses in the first two months of 2009, and two of the 
nation’s  biggest  banks  reported  a  drastic  decrease  in  profits  for  the  year’s  first 
trimester. UniCredit Tiriac Bank announced the adjustment of its interest rate by 3% 
for  private  individuals’  credits,  a  trend  started  by  other  big  banks,  such  as 
Transilvania Bank, Raiffeisen Bank, and GarantiBank. 
In May 2009 BNR reduced the nationally imposed interest rate from 10% to 
9.5% annually, after in February 2009 another 0.5% decrease had been made. BCR 
anticipated this decrease to go down to about 9% in the following months. BNR, 
however,  decided  to  maintain  the  minimum  reserve  requirement  for  the  passive 
investments in foreign currency to 40% and, for the passive investments in Lei to 
18%.  
In March 2009, the Romanian government borrowed 12.95 million Euros from 
the IMF (International Monetary Fund), as part of a foreign financing plan worth 20 
billion Euros, to which the European Commission and other international financial 
institutions  participate.  While  Fitch  appreciated  this  intervention,  they  cautiously 
proceeded with the changing of their rating and kept an eye out for how the local 
authorities follow through with their promises.  
 
Tranzactions. Real estate transaction number for December 2008 was only 
33,007, 50% less then December 2007. 
In  January  2009  transaction  number  also  decreased  by  50%  compared  with 
January 2008, from 33,400 to 17,300 sales, but November reached the minimum 
level, with a 54% decrease, after only 15% in September and November. (National 
Union of the Public Notaries of Romania, UNNPR).  
Per total, in 2008, 484.765 transactions have been made (UNNPR), 7% less then 
2007 when 521.636 transactions were closed. For the first two months of 2009, a Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 4, No. 3 
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26% transactions decrease was reported compared to the similar period of 2008. 
Decreases  of  real  estate operations  have  been  registered  throughout  the  country: 
Ilfov (minus 36%), Constanta (minus 33%), Timis and Arad (minus 23%). 
Production.  In  Q1  2009,  10571  construction  authorizations  for  residential 
buildings  have  been  issued,  10.5  %  less  than  Q1  2008.  In  Q3  2008,  11806 
construction authorizations for residential buildings have been issued, 13.1 % more 
than Q3 2007. The most relevant decreases were in the areas : Bucharest Ilfov ( 692), 
Center ( 263), Nord Vest ( 153) and North   East ( 104). 
In March 2009, 4363 construction authorizations for residential buildings have 
been issued, 16,7% more than February 2009and 17,7% less then March 2008. The 
most relevant decreases were in the areas: Bucharest Ilfov ( 364), Nord Est ( 209) 
and Center ( 132).  
 
 
Graphic 1: Construction authorizations for residential buildings, by areas, March 
2008 versus March 2009  










Graphic  2:  Construction  authorizations  for  residential  buildings  number  and 
area evolution, March 2007  March 2009.   
 
Prices.  In  order  to  analyze  residential  products  price  dynamics  under  crisis 
influence, we chose the Bucharest market quantification 
After the last years and a 2007 characterized by a continuous upward trend of 
the  residential  market,  for  both  new  and  old  apartments,  2008  was  strikingly 
different.  The  pick  of  price  evolution  on  the  residential  market  was  reached  in 
months 3 4 of 2008, all values after that being on a descending trend. Q2 2008 brings 
stagnation followed in Q3 and Q4 by a monthly  fall, down to 15 % in 6 months. Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 4, No. 3 
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The  difference  between  the  extreme  values  in  2008  (Maximum  in  April  and 
minimum  in  December)  is  350  Euro/mp*,  a  decrease  by  20%  in  nine  months 
according to BREI index.  
Old  residential  versus  new  residential  price  evolution.  The  striking 
difference between these 2 markets comes on the first place from the difference 
between  the  people  who  make  offers  on  the  market.  On  the  new  apartments 
residential market, the offer comes from developers – companies that have previous 
experience on other international markets, access to financial resources and a split 
exposure on the real estate market, not only on the residential market. On the other 
hand, the offer on the old apartments residential market comes from owners, in most 
cases natural persons on their first selling transaction of an apartment and with an 
immediate need to sell. Moreover, developers ask for an “objective” price, based on 
hard cost, soft cost and a desired profit margin, whereas the price of old apartments 
is “subjected”, influenced by rumors on the market. Its decreases and increases do 
not reflect a growth or fall in the real property value.  
Even  though  BREI V was way  under  BREI N  at  the  beginning  of  2007,  it 
registered a spectacular growth throughout the year. It surpassed BREI N with 140 
units  reaching  1.875  Euro/mp*  in  January  2008,  a  29%  increase.  Despite  some 
sudden falls in February, BREI V remained on top of BREI N for the whole first 
trimester  of  the  previous  year.  This  situation  changed  starting  with  April,  when 
BREI V was under BREI N. For the rest of 2008, BREI V had a descending path, 
which was only interrupted by a period of constant values in summer.  
For BREI N the year was split in 2 periods: a growth period, for the first 5 
months and one of constant values in the next six months. The end of the year 
brings the first decrease of BREI N, even though this decrease was sensed from 
September. We decided to introduce the effect of promotions on prices in BREI, 
after  a  6  month  period  of  constant  promotions  from  the  developers.  We  have 
considered that the “asking price” was thus being affected. In previous years, these 
price  reductions  were  specific  for  periods  when  the  number  of  transactions 
diminished, as in summer.  





Graphic 3: Comparative price evolution on old and new residential in Bucharest 
according to BREI n, BREI v (2008 Feb2009) 
 
Price  dynamics  by  sector.  For  BREI V  every  district’s  evolution  was 
correlated with the general index evolution. The most affected was district 6, with a 
decrease by 32%, over 500 Euro/sqm*. It is the most exposed because it targets 
middle class clients, who were most affected by the crisis. Moreover, district 6 has no 
luxury area, it is mostly influenced by the evolution in 2 areas: Militari and Drumul 
Taberei, both with a constant big offer that had to deal with a constant smaller 
demand.  
Mostly formed of luxury areas, prices in the 1st district decreased least in the 
previous year, by only 19%. It remains the most expensive district, with a medium 
price of 1.855 Euro/sqm*. The other districts decreased with appreciatively the same 
percent, 25% in December as compared with January.  
Table 1: Old residential prices by sector conf to BREI v (Bucharest in 2007 
2008) 
 










Graphic 5: Price evolution 3 rooms apartments in Bucharest according to sell 
prices registered on anuntul.ro website (Jan 2007 – Jan 2009)  
 





Graphic 6: Comparative price evolution on old and new residential in Bucharest 
according to BREI n, BREI v and anuntul.ro (2008) 
 
Conclusions and prognostics  
 
Construction sector had a spectacular evolution in 2008 with an increase of 56% 
insolvencies. But also, the same sector in Romania had the biggest increase from UE, 
16.1% in 2008. The increase was due to a large number of residential and commercial 
projects launch in 2007 and Q1 2008 witch generated an important business volume 
in the first part of 2008, as the crisis reached Romania later then the rest of EU.  
Real  estate  transaction  sector  brought  a  31%  insolvencies  increase  in  2008, 
showing  crisis  begging  witch  will  advance  with  the  first  part  of  2009.  UNNPR 
indicates  123.392  real  estate  transactions  in  2008  and  a  DTZ  Echinox  study 
estimated that they fall by 45% in 2008 comparing to 2007. The first part of 2008 
registered already a decline of residential transactions, mainly due to price level witch 
seemed to reach a braking maximum point. 
   External financial crisis shock waves combined with price levels in Q2 2008 
and low bank credit toward developers got to a blocking residential market with Q3 
2008. In this context, NBR’s change in credit policies – increase   towards population 
(with effect on mortgage loans) in Q4 2008 had a powerful influence on this market, 
without baring the one fault for it.  Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 4, No. 3 
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Residential market crisis was to be an upcoming moment in Romania, due to 
price level and speculative market character. This anticipation of it, due to external 
crisis contamination brings not only an important price reconfiguration (20 50%up 
to  April  2009)  but  also  the  overall  market  reconfiguration  and  maturity,  with  a 
decreased in developers number but an increase in their quality offer.  
Prognostics.  Even  if  prestigious  real  estate  consultants  have  pessimistic 
prognostics  over  the  residential  Romanian  market,  (four  years),  associating  it’s 
manifestation  to  the  one  in  Asia,  we  consider  decisive  for  Romania’s  case  the 
offer/demand rapport, witch hasn’t been saturated on either dimensions.  
 
Demand. The most affected by the demand were the investors , witch freezed 
their aquisitions due to financing problems and descending price expectation. This 
fact determins a gap beteen the existing offer and the potential demand on new 
appartments segment. The gap is enlarged by the last estimations of an up to 70% 
aquisitions by investors during 2005 2007. Consequently, the demand market will be 
on the future dominated by final and it shall register a diminueshed volume ( 2000 
units per year in Bucharest).  
Mainly for the final consumer, the demand depends by good bank credit offers. 
Theoretically,  as  an  effect  of  lowering  the  reference  interest  rate  by  NBR, 
successively in February and May 2009,from 10,25 to 9.5 % (and we estimate 9% by 
summer 2009) the credit rates (including mortgage credit loans) should go down. 
But, as lately banks have already diminished credit rates in order to re launch credit 
market, a new one is not to be predicted unless the minimum mandatory reserve is to 
be kept at the same level by the NBR. So, the effects of this February May lowered 
rate by NBR is to take effect in bank’s policies by Q3 2009, with full effect on T2 T3 
2010.   
Offer. New appartmens to be on sale will come from two sources. The main 
will remain direct sales from developing projects. This part of the offer is to be 
restricted  to  6,000  –  7,000  de  units  (forseen  to  be  delivered  in  the  next  12 18 
mounts) compaired with the 12,000 units anounced (Octombrie 2008), as developers 
should prospone projects or fases of them. Those urged to move in a new apartment 
will have acces to a second selling source: the appartments put on re sale by investors 
witch seek a fast excape from the market and by the final users witch give up their 
appartments due to financing problems. This new source is to bring on the market 
up to 5,500 de apartaments in finished or almost finished apartmens.  
Medium pesimistic scenario (of the offer absortion). The scenario who sees 
the investors re selling their residential products, determining continuous moderate 
descending prices. and market rehabilitation in four five years, when the actual offer 
would be absorbed, considering that the announced projects in 2008 were mainly 
suspended.  
Optiomistic  scenario  (of  the  market  psichology).  An  optimist  scenario 
estimates the residential market will start the process of revitalization by Q4 2009 – 




scenario  bets  on  the  buyer  physiology  of  “catching”  the  price  curve’s  minimum; 
when that should be felt of being close, the hold actions until now should manifest. 
As the actual prices are perceived to be determined mostly by psychological reasons 
not by the real offer/demand balance. It is unlikely that during this period another 
important  residential  project  would  be  launched.  There  will  come  a  period  of 
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